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1 
Introduction 
 Change is difficult. Civilizations have crumbled and the hopes and dreams of nations 
have been dashed on the rock of this seemingly incontrovertible truth. The modern Middle East 
reflects this truth. Despite (or perhaps because of) herculean U.S. investment, the region 
continues to crush and frustrate U.S. policy objectives in contemporary warfare. Even with the 
recent rise of Russia and China as the United States’ primary nation state competitors, the 
Middle East remains vitally important. Great Power competition from Russia and China has only 
added new layers of threats to a region already featuring dangerous (albeit non-existential) 
threats to the United States from terrorism, war, and instability. In the midst of the regional 
instability, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia maintain a fierce 
rivalry vying for regional hegemony. Increasingly, Saudi Arabia appears to view Iran as an 
existential threat and therefore willing to take a greater range of actions to deter and disrupt Iran 
while creating advantages in the rivalry.  The rivalry plays out across many critical dimensions 
of power and influence including religious, economic, and even direct military confrontations. 
Adding to the complexity, one state (Iran) remains one of the most overtly hostile actors towards 
U.S. policy while the other (Saudi Arabia) is a strong regional ally. The stakes of the Iran and 
Saudi Arabia rivalry for regional hegemony, which would allow the victor to control the bulk of 
the global energy flow and militarily encroach on key US regional allies, compel and incentivize 
U.S. action to at least monitor- if not actively influence- the regional competition.  
Because both Iran and Saudi Arabia are not fully compatible (as partners or potential 
partners) with the United States in terms of their orientation towards Western political and 
economic values (namely liberal-democratic and free-market principles), U.S. efforts to support 
and influence the rivalry should start with identifying and encouraging reform efforts within each 
country that seek to better align political and economic structures with U.S. and Western values. 
The purpose of this article is to identify the change agents in both Iran and Saudi Arabia working 
to bring Western political and economic values to each country and establish the contributing 
factors behind these reform initiatives (the “who” and the “why” regarding change). Next, the 
article will analyze the dynamics that fuel the reform initiatives in each country with an eye 
towards offering recommendations for U.S. policy and actions in the region (the “how” and 
“what next” of change). A fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy asserts that U.S. interests are 
best served in a stable international community. Likewise, a biblical worldview demands that, to 
the best extent possible, people (and nations) live peaceably amongst themselves.1 This implies 
an imperative to work towards peace and exhaust options before resorting to warfare. Smart 
policy and actions that effectively support, incentivize, and nurture reform initiatives to 
favorably resolve the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry in the Middle East represent the best chance for 
all parties to realize the great benefits of peace and stability in the much-maligned region. 
Part I: History, Religion, and Change 
For all their apparent differences, Iran and Saudi Arabia are remarkably similar (from a 
U.S. perspective) in one important area: they both desire regional hegemony in the Middle East. 
Their commitment to this shared goal is accompanied by a second, somewhat paradoxical, 
dynamic: the rivals often (as will be shown) either employ, or are influenced by, opposite 
 
1 Romans 12:18, NIV. 
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approaches and factors in their efforts to achieve hegemony.2 There are many superficial (or at 
least superficially treated) differences that mark the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry that are often 
mentioned and frequently used to definitively (though perhaps not accurately) explain the 
differences and animosity between the two rivals. Foremost among these differences is that fact 
that Iran is a predominantly Shia Muslim country while Saudi Arabia is Sunni Muslim. 
Additionally, Iranians are Persians while Saudis are Arabs. These differences no doubt contribute 
to the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and give it a (not-insignificant) religious and cultural dimension. 
However, there is much more to these differences, which apply only at the broadest levels, that 
transcend simple, neat, and tidy religious and cultural distinctions. Going beyond the surface-
level differences tied to Iran and Saudi Arabia’s differing religious and historical cultural 
heritage is critical to accurately evaluating and interpreting Western-style reform efforts in play 
in each country. 
Perhaps the obvious starting point for discussing the critical cultural and religious factors 
that impact current reform efforts in each country lies with a brief sketch of Iranian and Saudi 
history. People groups identifying themselves as “Iranians” or “Persians” have existed in roughly 
the same geographic location (modern day Iran) in varying conditions of political sovereignty for 
thousands of years. Even as Iran’s fortunes have ebbed and flowed with the currents of history, 
based on their own power and stability relative to conquering invaders, a distinctly “Iranian” 
identity can be traced back through this long historical lineage that still resonates with and 
impacts modern Iranians.3 Along with an enduring national identity, Iran’s history gives it 
extensive experience developing, building (and re-building) economies and complex societies. 
By contrast, the history of the modern state of Saudi Arabia begins in 1932 – after Abdul Aziz 
Ibn Saud unified the Nejd and Hijaz regions of the Arabian Peninsula to form the modern 
Kingdom.4 To be sure, this is not to suggest that no history existed in the Arabian Peninsula prior 
to Ibn Saud’s conquests (the peninsula founded a major religion and evidence of human 
existence dates back thousands of years).  Additionally, Abdul Azziz’s Kingdom represents the 
third such attempt- since the 18th century at forming a Saudi-family ruled kingdom on the 
Arabian Peninsula.5  However, unlike Iran, the history of a unified political and geographic 
entity with a distinctly Saudi identity is less than a century old. Using the metric of time, the 
Saudi state can be described as nascent (when compared with Iran) with considerably less 
experience building and developing the institutions of the modern state and (likely) a different 
set of societal expectations from government structures. 
Besides being on opposite sides of the historical spectrum, the current expressions of the 
modern state in both Saudi Arabia and Iran relied on religion in their establishment – though in 
opposite fashions. In unifying the Hijaz and Nejd regions of the Arabian Peninsula to form the 
boundaries of the Kingdom, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud relied on armies of religious holy warriors, 
known as the “ikhwan,” to fight and defeat his tribal enemies.6 These warriors, remnants of the 
ultra-conservative religious sect that formed the ideological basis of previous Saudi kingdoms, 
 
2 Kim Ghattas.  2020.  Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled 
Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East.  Henry Holt and Company. 
3 Michael Axworthy. 2016. A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind. Basic Books, a member of the Perseus 
Books Group. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat04401a&AN=jsou.ocn951551474&site=eds-live.  
4 Robert Lacy. 1981. The Kingdom. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.  
5 Lacey, The Kingdom, ch 1-2 
 6 Lacey, The Kingdom, 142. 
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fought (and won) many of the critical battles over competing tribes and territorial rivals on the 
Arabian peninsula for Abdul Aziz.7 Abdul Aziz could not have unified and created the modern 
Saudi state without the ikhwan.  However, after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with 
their radical religious tilt- became too extreme in their beliefs and desire to influence the 
burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul Aziz in 1929 to Saudi state without the ikhwan.  
However, after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with their radical religious tilt- became 
too extreme in their beliefs and desire to influence the burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul 
Aziz in 1929 to first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy the ikhwan a bloody final battle at 
the ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh.  The defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings 
latitude from the religious establishment to merge modernization efforts with religious traditions 
in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created 
by the cushion between religion and politics proved critically important (and lucrative) after the 
discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the formation of the still-enduring “special 
relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S.  Saudi state without the ikhwan.  However, 
after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with their radical religious tilt- became too extreme 
in their beliefs and desire to influence the burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul Aziz in 
1929 to first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy the ikhwan a bloody final battle at the 
ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh.  The defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings 
latitude from the religious establishment to merge modernization efforts with religious traditions 
in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created 
by the cushion between religion and politics proved critically important (and lucrative) after the 
discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the formation of the still-enduring “special 
relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S.  Saudi state without the ikhwan.  However, 
after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with their radical religious tilt- became too extreme 
in their beliefs and desire to influence the burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul Aziz in 
1929 to first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy the ikhwan a bloody final battle at the 
ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh.  The defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings 
latitude from the religious establishment to merge modernization efforts with religious traditions 
in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created 
by the cushion between religion and politics proved critically important (and lucrative) after the 
discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the formation of the still-enduring “special 
relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S.  first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy 
the ikhwan a bloody final battle at the ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh.8 The 
defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings latitude from the religious establishment to merge 
modernization efforts with religious traditions in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to 
engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created by the cushion between religion and politics proved 
critically important (and lucrative) after the discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the 
formation of the still-enduring “special relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S.9  
In post-1979 Iran, the opposite played out. Capitalizing on mass protests against a 
decadent, corrupt, and repressive government, Shia religious hardliners hijacked the movement 
and installed the current revolutionary regime. The so-called “Islamic Revolution” in Iran was 
not wholly (or even predominantly) religious. Indeed, many groups (such as the Kurds, liberal 
minded intelligentsia, and leftists) who initially supported Ayatollah Khomeini upon his return to 
 
7 Lacy, The Kingdom, 142-146: description of the Ikhwan, their origin,and how Abduz Aziz used them. 
 8 Lacey, The Kingdom, 236. 
 9 Bruce Riedel. 2017. Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the US since FDR. The Brookings Institute. 
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Tehran in 1979 found themselves the targets of his repression as he consolidated his gains in the 
aftermath of the uprising.10 As reported by Misagh Parsa, such efforts led to the arrest and 
slaughtering of estimated thousands of dissenters- including some in Khomeini’s immediate and 
higher political circle- over the course of the regime’s rise to power after 1979.11   According to 
Parsa’s account, few in Iran were expecting (or desiring) the religious clerical takeover that 
Khomeini implemented as part of his “religious guardianship” (vilayat-e-faqih”) theocraic 
system of governement.12  The history of violent repression and suppression of all political and 
religious opposition continued through the generations that followed the revolution and today, 
many have declared the revolution “dead” while estimating that 85% of the population do not 
support the hardline religious regime.13  The adoption of Khomeini’s hardline religious regime  
vilayat-e-faqih both directly (through its revolutionary policies) and indirectly (through the 
consequences of those policies) isolated Iran from Western ideology and collaboration.14  
King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud was a statesman who deftly co-opted tribal and religious 
elements to establish the modern political boundaries and identity of Saudi Arabia. In contrast, 
modern Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, infamously quipped that he was a “revolutionary, not 
a diplomat.”15 In other words, he identified more as a religious zealot and not as a statesman. 
While being careful not to oversimplify, the difference in leaders reflects a great deal about the 
role of religion in the two states. Modern Western fear-mongers love to point to Saudi Arabia’s 
historical alliance with so-called radical religious idealism to disparage the Kingdom as a 
sponsor of terrorism – lumping them into the same category as Iran. However, the facts tell a 
different story. In a very real sense, it can be said that Saudi Arabia used religion (the ikhwan 
warriors) to establish a political entity (the modern Saudi state) while Iran, by influencing 
protests for political change, used political entities(the diverse and popular political unrest 
against the Shah in 1979) to establish a religion (Khomeini’s ‘vilayat-e-faqih’). In this narrow 
sense, one can speculate that the revolutionary mechanisms and outwardly hostile disposition of 
the Iranian government are what Saudi Arabia might have looked like if the ikhwan had 
triumphed during the early years of the Kingdom and, conversely, the openness toward 
engagement with the West that marks the Saudi government is what Iran might have looked like 
if the political activists of the Iranian Revolution had not been totally subsumed by the radical 
religious clerics.  
As noted from the outset, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia align completely with U.S. 
conceptions of an ideal regional ally. The misalignment is likely related to the extent to which 
each rival has inculcated (or shown a willingness to inculcate) Western political and economic 
values. Accordingly, U.S. efforts to support or influence the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry require the 
identification and support of domestic initiatives to bring about desired changes in each country. 
Here too, the domestic dynamics within Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken on antonymous 
attributes. In Saudi Arabia, ruling elites represent the change agents advocating for Western 
 
 10 Axworthy, Empire of the Mind, 257. 
 11  Misagh Parsa.  2016.  Democracy in Iran: Why it Failed and How it Might Succeed.  Boston: MA.  
Harvard University Press. 65.  
12 Parsa, Democracy in Iran, 61-63. 
  13 Dexter Filkins, “The Twilight of the Iranian Revolution,” The New Yorker, 18 May 2018, accessed 14 
July 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution.  
   14   Parsa, Democracy in Iran, 84-88. 
15 David Sanger, “Supreme Leader of Iran Rejects Direct Talks with the US,” New York Times, 07 
February, 2013 
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reforms and push efforts to integrate Western values (free-market and, to an extent, liberal 
democratic principles) from the “top down.” Recognizing the precarious state of a one-
dimensional economy totally dependent on oil revenue, Saudi’s young crown prince, Muhamad 
bin Salman (MBS), introduced a grand vision for diversifying the Saudi economy, establishing 
more free-market principles, and introducing modest liberal democratic values in society to make 
Saudi Arabia more attractive to investors, tourists, and the world at-large.16 His plan, dubbed 
Vision 2030, represents an ambitious- and prescient- effort to bring western-style change to the 
Kingdom. However, the plan has encountered staunch resistance from –surprisingly- the Saudi 
citizenry.17 Accustomed to lucrative government benefits and support, Saudi citizens appear 
resistant to austerity measures related to Vision 2030 goals introduced by the government.18  
Additionally, the near total reliance on foreign labor in critical sectors of their economy indicate 
that Saudis seem unwilling or unable to establish and form the type of manufacturing and 
construction industry sectors that the new and diversified economy (according to Vision 2030) 
will require.19 
“Top down” efforts driving Western-style reforms have also manifested themselves in the 
social and foreign policy realms. MBS’ initiatives have recently introduced modest (but 
significant) liberal-democratic values into Saudi society by allowing women to drive, severely 
curbing the power of the mutawa- the Saudi religious police charged with enforcing Islamic 
social standards of decency-, and making the wearing of the traditional conservative female 
covering, the abaya, optional.20 In the foreign policy realm, MBS has drastically re-defined the 
Saudi relationship with the Salafi-influenced Muslim Brotherhood, cutting ties with the 
organization and even going so far to label the group a “terrorist” organization while punishing 
Gulf neighbors for their support of the group.21 Saudi Arabia is perhaps trying to re-brand 
moderate Islam as the state religion and garner more widespread support for their soft-power 
approaches aimed at building and supporting Islamic institutions. These efforts demonstrate the 
comprehensive scope of “top-down” reform efforts aimed at steering the country more towards 
Western-values. 
 In Iran, the opposite reform dynamic holds sway as a frustrated Iranian citizenry 
represents the change agents advocating for Western reform. Weary of financing a plethora of 
foreign wars and angry at widespread government corruption that has impoverished the nation, 
protests demanding (among other things) Western-style reform emanate from the “bottom-up” in 
Iranian society. In January 2018, protests erupted in over 30 Iranian cities as the economy 
 
16 Full Text: Saudi Vision 2030, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2016/04/26/Full-text-
of-Saudi-Arabia-s-Vision-2030.html  
17 Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is Too Big to Fail- or Succeed. Stratfor, 27 July, 2018. 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/articl-e/saudi-arabias-vision-2030-plan-too-big-fail-or-succeed .  
18 Zahraa Alkhalisi, “Saudi Arabia Eases Austerity After ‘Very Negative’ Response.”  CNN, 09 January 
2018.  https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/09/news/economy/saudi-arabia-austerity-backlash/index.html 
   19  Laura El-Katiri, “Saudi Arabia’s Labor Market Challenge.”  Harvard Business Review.  06 July, 2016.  
https://hbr.org/2016/07/saudi-arabias-labor-market-challenge  
20 Dona Abu-Naser, “Even Saudi Arabia’s Most Conservative Heartland is Opening Up,” Bloomberg 
News, 5 August 2019, accessed 14 July, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-08-06/even-saudi-
arabia-s-most-conservative-heartland-is-starting-to-sing.  
21 Mohamed Qandil, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia: From Then to Now,” Washington 
Institute, 18 May 2018, accessed 14 July 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-muslim-
brotherhood-and-saudi-arabia-from-then-to-now.  
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collapsed under the weight of government mismanagement and U.S. sanctions.22 Indeed, a 
popular chant among the protesters of this time cried “Death to the Ayatollah.” However, 
government agents and apparatus show little signs of reforming a system that enriches and 
empowers them. 
 Both the religious and historical factors discussed above heavily impact the state and 
disposition of reform efforts in Saudi Arabia and Iran. The “short-termism” (that is, a preference 
to maintain the lucrative status quo despite the long-term dangers) that characterizes the Saudi 
citizenry resistance to “top-down” reform reflects its nascent status as a political entity- still 
wrestling with how to develop and implement critical political and government structures to best 
support the citizenry in the long-term. As noted by scholar Dani Thompson, the nature of the 
“social bargain” between modern Saudi rulers and their citizens trades government assurances of 
prosperity (lucrative financial benefits) for unquestioned social and political patronage.23   Saudi 
preference for lucrative government support is indirectly tied to the role religion played in the 
formation of the Kingdom- which allowed it to have a prosperous and open relationship with the 
West and has perhaps created a set of expectations for prosperity amongst the citizenry that is 
proving difficult to sustain. Likewise, Iran’s resistance to “bottom-up” efforts reflects its history 
and the role religion played in founding the modern (post-1979) state. Iran’s citizens have a 
historical perspective of events that influences their expectations of the state. They can clearly 
look back through history and see prosperous, fully developed Persian empires- such as the 
Achaemenids (550 B.C.), the Safavids (1500)- at the forefront of civilization.24 These memories 
likely fuel bottom-up cries for change and also reflect the fact that (unlike the nascent Saudi 
state), Iran has all the ingredients for a diversified economy. However, the role of religion in 
forming the modern state makes enmity with the West a foregone conclusion (and, indeed, a 
stated policy objective from the current regime).25 Thus, the ruling regime’s resistance to 
Western-style reforms is a natural and obstinate outgrowth of the system.  
  
 
22 Thomas Erdbrink, “Protests Pop Up Across Iran Fueled by Daily Disatisfaction,” New York Times, 4 
August 2018, accessed 18 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/middleeast/iran-
protests.html.  
    23 Dani Thompson, “Saudi Arabia’s Creative Change of (He)art.  Capstone Paper, The Elliott School of 
International Affairs, George Washington University.  May, 2020.  https://cpb-us-
e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/6/1613/files/2020/05/DaniThompson-
Capstone2020SaudiChangeofHeart_3.pdf  
24 Axworthy, History of Iran, chapters 1-2. 
25 Parsa, Democracy in Iran, 100-103. 
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FIGURE 1: Change Paradigms in Iran and Saudi Arabia 
 
Part II: Guarding of the Change: A Power and Systems Perspective of Reform Initiatives  
 Having distilled both who the change agents and resistance elements are in each country 
and why the reform paradigms are arrayed the way they are in each country, it is necessary to 
analyze how the change dynamics in Iran and Saudi Arabia develop and persist in order to 
recommend effective actions advocating for desired reforms while blunting unwanted resistance 
to change. While theories and concepts abound regarding how change happens, one way to 
approach the question is through a “power and systems” approach (PSA) as explained by author 
Duncan Green. In his book How Change Happens, Green articulates how those desiring to bring 
about reform must understand both the complex systems involved in the change process as well 
as the actors who wield the power to adopt changes in the system.26 As an offshoot of the 
systems approach to change, researchers from Harvard University suggest and demonstrate that 
the prospects of introducing divergent change into a system is directly related to how open or 
closed the system is.27 In closed systems with tightly organized networks, successfully 
introducing and adopting divergent change is very difficult. Conversely, in open networks 
(defined as having “structural holes” between the connections), introducing divergent change is 
often more feasible. In addition to these relationships between systems and change, Duncan 
Green also notes the role of power in the change process. Green identifies various dimensions of 
power that bear on the change process, notably “visible power” (i.e. the overt and official 
structures of government and political power), “hidden power” (i.e. the actions by actors behind 
 
26 Duncan Green. 2016. How Change Happens. Oxford University Press. 
27 Julie Battilana et al. “Change Agents, Networks, And Institutions: A Contingency Theory of 
Organizational Change,” Harvard Business School Faculty Publications, 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/Change-
%20Agents,%20Networks,%20and%20Institutions_28a6776e-06c7-46cb-8cec-d748d6855c48.pdf.  
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the scenes of official power structures), and “invisible power” (i.e. the psychological forces at 
work that cause societies to accept their condition). Taken together, the power and systems 
principles for analyzing change may go a long way in explaining the state of reform initiatives in 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
As a monarchy ruled by a single family, the political system in Saudi Arabia is a tightly 
closed system – deriving its inputs from a single source (the Royal family). As per the dynamics 
described above, this makes the introduction of divergent change, like the Western-style change 
described in Vision 2030, unlikely to succeed as securing needed support from critical societal 
stakeholders for rapid and large-scale reforms becomes difficult. Indeed, upon assuming his 
powerful new role as crown prince, MBS initiated a series of high profile arrests for corruption- 
including royal family members-which many saw as his attempt to consolidate power, or, in 
terms of power and systems, his attempt to influence the closed political system to support his 
Vision 2030 goals.28 Much of the criticism surrounding MBS’ Vision 2030 highlights that his 
plan introduces ambitious and positive economic reforms without the necessary and 
corresponding political reforms to make it work. In other words, according to a power and 
systems approach to change, the closed Saudi system is too rigid to support such divergent 
economic reform without reforms that also open the political system. On the power side of the 
equation, the resistance from the Saudi citizenry reflects the “invisible power” developed over 
time from a population that has grown to accept (and protect) its condition as the beneficiaries of 
government sponsorship. Armed with this “invisible power,” the Saudi citizenry mobilizes its 
“hidden power” to obstruct and/or delay some of the government austerity measures (visible 
power) required for the implementation of Vision2030.  
As noted earlier, in Iran, the reform initiatives advocating for Western values emanate 
from the citizenry in a bottom-up fashion. However, the system that generates these initiatives is 
extremely open- taking inputs from a number of sources. Unlike the “Green Movement” in 2009 
that mobilized massive and sustained Iranian resistance to the government over the unified cause 
of alleged election fraud, the distinguishing characteristic of the most recent wave of protests in 
Iran in early 2018 was their inability to coalesce around a single issue.29 Protesters trotted out a 
litany of slogans during the protests- from the traditional “Death to America” and “Death to 
Israel” to the more unconventional “Death to Rouhani” and “Death to the Ayatollah.” In essence, 
Iranians seemed to be saying “Death to everything” and thus no single issue emerged. In this 
environment, the “hidden power” of a mobilized Iranian citizenry lacks the unification required 
to influence the strong “visible power” structures of the Iranian regime.  
It is difficult to have a changing of the guard while there is a “guarding of the change.” 
That is, even as movements exist in both Iran and Saudi Arabia advocating for Western-style 
reform, efforts in both Saudi Arabia and Iran remain frustrated as power structures in each 
system jealously guard any attempts at reform. In Saudi Arabia, a closed system, in conjunction 
with the “invisible” and “hidden” powers of the citizenry hinders top-down reform initiatives. In 
Iran, bottom-up reform initiatives born in an (overly) open system lack the unifying force from 
“hidden” and “invisible” power sources to seriously challenge the “visible power” of the Iranian 
regime.  
 
28 David Kirkpatrick. “Saudi Arabia Arrests 11 Princes, Including Billionaire Alwaleed bin Talal,” New 
York Times, 4 November 2017. 
29 Ray Takey. 2018, “Masses vs. Mullahs: Iran’s Rulers Losing their Last Group of Supporters,” National 
Review, (February 2018) 
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FIGURE 2: Power and Systems Iceberg Analysis of Change in Iran and Saudi Arabia 
 
Part III: The Difference Between Reform and “Re-Form” 
 The above analysis and assessment of Western-style reform initiatives currently playing 
out within the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry throws into sharp relief the divergent dynamics of 
reform in each country. Understanding the differences makes it possible to evaluate the prospects 
of reform initiatives in each country and make recommendations that both support change agents 
and help overcome tension and obstructions from resistance elements in each country. In Saudi 
Arabia, reform initiatives require a more open political system – with more diversity among the 
inputs- that will more readily embrace the divergent reforms offered by Vision2030. Perhaps 
more difficult are the cultural and societal attitudes and expectations that must shift in Saudi 
Arabia to overcome the “invisible power” perceptions of the citizenry. The amazingly wealthy -
yet dangerously one-dimensional economy resulting from oil wealth creates internal 
psychological resistance towards establishing an economy based on Western values that rely on 
diverse market competition from the private sector because it challenges (and threatens) the 
decades-old basis of the “social bargain” between Saudis and their rulers—forcing adjustments 
in expectations.30  While the ruling elite in Saudi Arabia recognize the long-term unsustainability 
and in-feasibility of the current system (and have introduced Western-style reforms on this 
basis), they are learning a fact that the U.S. knows all too well from its foreign policy experience 
abroad: winning the “hearts and minds” of a society can be extremely difficult.31 
 In Iran (and unlike in Saudi Arabia), the groundwork for a diverse and complex economy 
already exists while a willing and able population clamors for the opportunity to return Iran to 
 
30 Dani Thompson, Saudi Arabia’s Creative New (He)art, 8. 
31 Dafna Linzer, “Lost in Translation: Alhurra: America’s Troubled Effort to Win Middle East Hearts and 
Minds,” ProPublica, 22 June, 2008.  https://www.propublica.org/article/alhurra-middle-east-hearts-and-minds-622.  
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the prominence it has enjoyed for long periods of its history. The problem lies in the corrupt 
“visible power” structures of the regime that control the wealth at the expense of the population. 
Perhaps no organization symbolizes the corruption of the Iranian regime better than the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Having evolved from its early role as a military protector of 
the revolution after 1979, today the IRGC controls large swaths of the Iranian economy and its 
appetite for wealth, power, and control comes at the expense of the Iranian people.32 Reform in 
Iran requires the “invisible” and “hidden” power sources within the Iranian citizenry to unite 
(like in 2009) and compel the necessary concessions and reforms from the regime.  
 On balance, the prospects for Western-style reform in both Iran and Saudi Arabia can be 
stated in terms of the difference between “reform” and “re-form.” In Iran, political reform of the 
mechanisms which distribute power and wealth will help re-vitalize an economy and society that 
is already built and awaiting the opportunity. In Saudi Arabia, “re-forming” the economy and 
society to be both less dependent on oil (economy) and less accustomed to its artificial wealth 
(society) will help re-align the power and systems dynamics to support Western-style reforms. 
Despite the current geopolitical dynamics in which the United States enjoys a much closer and 
productive relationship with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia seems to have a harder path forward in 
terms of introducing and adopting Western reforms. While the difference between “reform” and 
“re-form” seems subtle (and possibly just semantics), one (reform) involves adjusting political 
mechanisms. This is (largely) what is required in Iran. The other (re-form) requires the arguably 
much more difficult and lengthy task of re-building not just an authentic economy, but also the 
psychological and cultural expectations of a society. This is the scope of the work for Saudi 
Arabia. 
 When considering how best to influence desired reform efforts in Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
a useful framework for characterizing national actions categorizes the elements of national power 
(the tools available to statesmen and policy makers) according to diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic domains. Collectively, these elements of national power are known as 
DIME and provide a common language to articulate recommendations. In supporting Western-
style reforms in the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, the U.S. should seek to conduct DIME actions that 
support the change agents in each country while decreasing the concerns of the resistors. In 
Saudi Arabia, the “visible power” government leaders represent the change agents seeking to 
introduce and adopt Western-style reform in the country. U.S. actions, therefore, should seek to 
develop cooperation (when possible) with this entity to help nurture and advise the reform 
initiatives associated (mainly) with Vision2030. One action in the diplomatic (D) domain that the 
U.S. can (and should) take immediately is to end the politically motivated attacks and 
accusations emanating from American political circles that characterize the Saudi government as 
a state sponsor of terror and/or as bearing responsibility for the September 11th attacks in the 
U.S.33 In 2016, congress passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) which 
New York Democrat Chuck Schumer sponsored and which aimed to link official Saudi 
 
32 Ramin Jahanbegloo, “Revolution Is Not Here,” The Indian Express, 3 January 2018, accessed 6 
September 2018, 
http://dspace.jgu.edu.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10739/1507/1/Revolution%20is%20not%20here%20_%20The%20Indi
an%20Express.pdf.  
33 Morgan Phillips, “US to Share Name of Saudi Suspected in Aiding 9/11 Attackers,” Fox News, 12 
September 2018, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/justice-department-to-release-name-of-individual-with-alleged-
saudi-government-ties-who-aided-in-9-11-attacks  
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compliance in the 9/11 attacks to justice for the U.S. victims.34 However, after its passing and 
perhaps realizing the frivolity of the action (which incurred a presidential veto), many of the 
act’s supporters immediately called for revisions to the act – acknowledging, among other things, 
the risks created for Americans serving in Saudi Arabia and the geopolitical consequences of 
undermining a strong regional ally.35  These actions reveal the nakedly political objectives of the 
act while exposing the folly in seeking justice in the wrong places.  Besides being widely dis-
proven in the official U.S. investigation of 9/11, allegations of official Saudi involvement in 9/11 
belie the fact that the Saudi government fought its own bloody battle against Sunni-extremism in 
the mid-2000s.36 Calling Saudi Arabia Bin Laden’s “third front” in his global terror campaign, 
Bruce Riedel highlights how Al Qaeda infiltrated the Kingdom and viciously fought to 
overthrow the “apostate” royal family in the mid-2000s.37 During this time, U.S. and Saudi 
Counter-Terrorism experts worked closely to bring about the military defeat of Al-Qaeda in the 
Kingdom.38 It is also worth remembering that before Bin Laden and Al Qaeda hated America, 
they hated Saudi Arabia. The Saudis expelled Bin Laden from the Kingdom in 1991 and Bin 
Laden himself reserved some of his most vitriolic comments for the Kingdom – not the United 
States.39  
Clearly, radical Islamic terrorism is a shared threat between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia. The extremist ideology that motivated the 9/11 attacks exists everywhere – including, as 
recruitment for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) demonstrates, in the West.40 
Laying this issue at the feet of the Saudi Arabia in the name of justice exposes American 
political intrigue to exactly the same extent that it compromises American ideals – the very 
ideals that the Saudi government has shown a willingness to import. It is irresponsible and short-
sighted to manipulate the sanctity of American values for expedient political ends and those who 
supported the JASTA (against the judgement of the White House), seem to have acknowledged 
this reality. Plainly, linking official Saudi involvement to the terror attack of 9/11 is as frivolous 
and preposterous as claiming that the U.S. was complicit in the Oklahoma City bombing because 
Timothy McVeigh was once a government employee. The (unfortunately) oft-repeated narrative 
of official Saudi involvement in terror plots against the U.S. only alienates the very agents of 
Western-style change in Saudi Arabia that should be courted and supported. In addition to 
alienating the change agents in Saudi Arabia, falsely asserting Saudi links to terrorism for 
political gain undermines and discredits legitimate U.S. messages attempting to hold Saudi 
Arabia accountable to Western values in other areas. Bluntly, by trumpeting a false narrative of 
official Saudi support for terrorism, U.S. condemnations of Saudi Arabia involvement in 
potential human rights violations (i.e. Jamal Khashogi) sound hollow and disingenuous.  
 
34 Congress Overrides Obama's Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. (2017). American 
Journal of International Law, 111(1), 156-162. doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.7 
35 Ted Barrett and Deidre Walsh. 2016. Congress Suddenly Has Buyers Remorse for Overriding Obama’s 
Veto. https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/29/politics/obama-911-veto-congressional-concerns/index.html. 
36 Thomas Small et al. 2015. Path of Blood: The Story of Al Qaeda’s War on the House of Saud. Simon and 
Schuster. 
37 Bruce Riedel. 2008. Al-Qaeda’s Third Front: Saudi Arabia. The Washington Quarterly. 
38 Thomas Small, Path of Blood. 
39 Who is bin Laden?: Chronology". PBS. Archived from the original on April 14, 2010. Retrieved June 09, 
2020. 
40 Pilar Cerbrian. 2019. They Left to Join ISIS. Now Europe Is Leaving Their Citizens to Die in Iraq. 
Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/15/they-left-to-join-isis-now-europe-is-leaving-their-citizens-to-
die-in-iraq/ 
11
Harr: A Guarding of the Change
Published by Scholars Crossing, 2020
12 
 In the informational (I) domain, the U.S. can decrease resistance to Western-style 
reforms in Saudi Arabia by expanding programs that allow Saudi citizens to study and 
collaborate in the U.S. Widening existing exchange programs to let Saudis observe and live 
Western values attacks the “invisible power” resistance currently playing out amongst Saudi 
citizens. This action advertises, in a supremely practical way, the American way of life. As an 
informational (I) tool, it gives Saudis (and all foreigners) better information and tangible 
evidence regarding the benefits of implementing American values. At a time when Middle East 
migration and travel to the U.S. is a hot button issue and often a black-eye for the U.S. in the 
Muslim world, encouraging exchanges for qualified Saudis could go a long way (over time) in 
reducing psychological attitudes resistant (or even ambivalent) to Western values.41 The 
dynamics of change outlined above and throughout this article indicate that Western-style 
reforms will be hard enough to achieve in their own right within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. should 
not make it harder by amplifying false messages that discourage Saudi Arabia change agents 
while doing little to entice and attract those within Saudi Arabia towards Western values. 
 In Iran, change agents advocating for Western values originate largely from the “bottom-
up” within the Iranian citizenry. Therefore, U.S. efforts to support reform should work to support 
the movements generated by ordinary Iranians. One action in the economic (E) domain that the 
U.S. should consider taking is ending the robust (and often unilateral) economic sanctions 
imposed on Iran. As the centerpiece of U.S. efforts to exert “maximum pressure” on the Iranian 
regime, the sanctions are designed to curb Iranian support to terrorism in the region and coerce 
Iran to the negotiating table regarding its nuclear weapons program.42 However, to date, the 
sanctions are not achieving these ends. Iran has at least sustained (and perhaps increased) its 
support to regional terror proxies even in spite U.S. sanctions. Iranian-supported Shia militia 
groups (SMGs) in Iraq routinely target American and allied bases with rocket attacks.43 
Additionally, recent allied maritime operations have interdicted large Iranian shipments of 
weapons intended to support the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen.44 Furthermore, Iran’s 
leaders have flatly rejected American overtures and offers for unqualified negotiations.45 Perhaps 
even more significant than the sanctions failure to achieve their stated purpose is the fact that 
they these sanctions work to frustrate reform efforts in the country in several important ways. 
First, the economic hardship resulting from the sanctions falls on the Iranian people – the change 
agents. The value of the Iranian currency has plummeted to all-time lows because of the 
sanctions which has in turn created massive inflation and economic devastation in Iran.46 During 
 
41 Stuart Anderson, “Muslim Travel Ban: Less Immigration, Fewer Waivers,” Forbes, March 11, 2019, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/03/11/muslim-travel-ban-less-immigration-and-few-
waivers/#56526d2c27f0  
42 Debates: The Maximum Pressure Campaign is Working. Hoover Institution. 04 March, 2020. 
https://www.intelligences-quaredus.org/debates/maximum-pressure-campaign-against-iran-working. 
43 Air Defense Systems Intercept Rocket Targeting US Embassy in Iraq, 05 July 2020. 
https://112.international/politics/air-defense-systems-intercept-rocket-targeting-us-embassy-in-iraq-52780.html 
44 Shawn Snow. Ship Seizures Included ‘relatively new’ Iranian surface to air missile bound for Houthi 
Rebels in Yemen. 19 Feb 2020. https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/19/ship-seizures-included-
relatively-new-iranian-surface-to-air-missile-bound-for-houthi-rebels-in-yemen/ 
45 Robin Wright. Iran’s Foreign Minister Was Invited to Meet Trump in the Oval Office. The New Yorker. 
02 Aug 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/irans-foreign-minister-invited-to-meet-trump-in-the-
oval-office 
46 Iran Rial Slides to New Low as Coronavirus, Sanctions Weigh New York Times. 04 July 2020. 
https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/07/04/world/middleeast/04reuters-iran-economy-rial.html 
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the 2018 widespread protests across Iran demanding (among other things) better economic 
conditions, “Death to America” remained a popular refrain from the Iranian crowds indicating a 
perception of American blame for the economic conditions47 In illustrating the reform-stifling 
effects of sanctions, a comparison to military targeting methods is useful. In the military, the 
“law of proportionality” dictates that lethal responses to aggression be proportional to the offense 
given. That is, it is unlawful to destroy a hospital full of civilians simply because a single 
terrorist enters the facility. Sanctions are the economic equivalent of this violation: in desiring to 
economically target the ruling regime (the single terrorist), U.S. sanctions level the entire Iranian 
economy (the hospital full of civilians). The devastating effects of this methodology are 
particularly acute in Iran because the vast collateral damage incurred through sanctions 
represents the very demographic (Iranian citizenry) that should be supported in their reform 
efforts. 
 More targeted options for economic actions exist that could be considered such as 
increasing the scope and support of U.S. and allied efforts tracking and penalizing Iranian 
financial support to terrorism through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) initiated 
after 9/11.48 According to the U.S. Department of State 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, the 
Countering Transnational Terrorism Fund (CTTF), also established specifically to target funds 
earmarked for global terrorism, has produced tangible results building international coalitions 
dedicated to interdicting the money supply that supporters of terrorism, such as Iran, rely on to 
conduct de-stabilizing operations. Not only do such actions leverage the global community of 
interest in stopping terrorism, but they represent efforts committed to targeting strictly terrorist 
funds - not the national economy of a nation-state.  
Besides engendering anger and hostility from the very population that U.S. actions should 
endeavor to support, the sanctions also enable the Iranian Regime to mask their corrupt practices 
by giving it a convenient and attractive (not to mention accurate) scapegoat for the Iranian 
economic malaise: the West – an in particular the U.S. Secondly, the sanctions marginalize and 
discredit moderate reformist leaders who represent the best chance for incremental and positive 
Western-style reform in the country’s “visible power” structures. Iran’s current president, Hassan 
Rouhani, is a moderate who won his election largely on promises of economic recovery tied to 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, the recovery has failed to 
materialize- largely because of heavy U.S. sanctions- and Rouhani has in turn become the focal 
point for Iranian criticism.49 Additionally, hard-liners all but swept the most recent parliamentary 
elections in Iran.50 These results are either an indicator of increased Iranian popular support to 
the hard-liner agenda or of the persistent power of the hard-line regime to maintain political 
control in spite of “maximum pressure” economic actions. In essence, hard-liners within the 
Iranian regime can point to moderate reformist leaders and say to Iranians: “See, reformist 
 
47 Parisa Hafezi. 2018. Iranian Marchers Chant “Death to America on Eve of U.S. Oil Sanctions.” Reuters, 
November 4th 2018, accessed 09 June 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa/iranian-marchers-chant-
death-to-america-on-eve-of-u-s-oil-sanctions-idUSKCN1N908J.  
48 U.S. Department of Treasury: Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. Overview available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/terrorist-finance-tracking-program-tftp 
49 Oren Dorell, “Iran Leader Sees No Short Term Payoff from Lifting of Sanctions,” USA Today (website), 
18 January 2016), accessed 6 September 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/01/18/iranian-
president-rouhani-sees-no-short-term-payoff-sanctions-relief/78965874/. 
50 Golnar Motevalli. Hardliners’ Victory in Iranian Elections Turns Back the Clock on Relations With the 
West. Feb, 2020. https://time.com/5789565/iran-elections-hardliners/ 
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policies don’t work and you’re better off under our hardline policies.” Thus, sanctions actually 
seem to swing the country more towards hardline, anti-Western leaders and policy.  
U.S. sanctions also seem to have pushed Iran into the orbit of great power adversaries of 
the United States as Iran seeks nation-state partners to circumvent the sanctions. Iran recently 
confirmed its “strategic” negotiations with China as part of a long-term partnership with 
Beijing.51 A “Sino-Persian” alliance- featuring a partnership between America’s most potent 
great power rival (China) and its most dangerous nation-state threat (Iran)- would greatly 
destabilize the Middle East and displace American influence.  
It is true that lifting sanctions would give the Iranian regime access to vastly more 
financial resources and perhaps invigorate its hostile military and foreign policy objectives. But 
without Western free-market principles under-girding their economy, it is unlikely that Iranians 
will see the trickle-down benefits of the increased capital. Thus, reform initiatives emanating 
from the citizenry will likely persist even without American sanctions because their core 
grievance against the regime will remain. As noted by scholar Afshin Shahi, since the early 
1990s, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been consolidating economic power 
and control in Iran which ensures the formation of gross wealth inequalities between the ruling 
elite and the average Iranian citizen.52 Indeed, analyst Ramin Jahanbegloo also highlights how 
the IRGC likely controls all major industries in Iran.53 This type of oligarchic control breeds 
corruption and is the antithesis of Western free-market principles. Lifting sanctions will (finally) 
expose and lay bare Iranian corruption (without Western scapegoats) for all to see which, in turn, 
could invigorate and unify Iranian change agents’ initiatives aimed at steering the country 
towards Western values. 
In the Information (I) domain, increasing broadcasts of Persian language messages of 
support to the protesters that emphasize American liberal democratic values is one way to help 
build and spread support for Western style reform efforts originating at the grassroots level in 
Iranian society. In March 2019, Voice of America announced the establishment of a 24/7 Persian 
language broadcast to help disseminate positive American messages and combat the spread of 
disinformation from the state-controlled Iranian media in Iran.54 Demonstrating the power of this 
information tool, President Trump’s Persian-language tweets of support for Iranian protesters in 
early 2019 became the most-liked Persian language tweet in history.55 Conditions appear ripe in 
this domain to assist Iranian reform efforts.  
 
51 Tehran Boasts About Strategic Cooperation With Beijing. ASharq Al-Awsat.  30 Jun 2020. 
https://english.aawsat.com/h-ome/article/2362341/tehran-boasts-about-%E2%80%98strategic-
cooperation%E2%80%99-beijing. 
52 Afshin Shahi. 2017. The Military and the State in Iran: The Economic Rise of the Revolutionary Guards, 
The Middle East Journal, (2017), 71, 1:67-86. 
53 Ramin Jahanbegloo, “Revolution Is Not Here,” The Indian Express, 3 January 2018, accessed 09 June 
2020, 
http://dspace.jgu.edu.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10739/1507/1/Revolution%20is%20not%20here%20_%20The%20Indi
an%20Express.pdf  
54 Voice of America Launches Voa 365, a 24/7 Persian Language Network. 19 March 2019. Voice of 
America Public Relations Website. https://www.insidevoa.com/a/voice-of-america-launches-voa-365-a-24-7-
persian-language-network/4814792.html.  
55 Carlin Becker, “Trump Sends the Most Liked Persian Tweet in History of Twitter,” Washington 
Examiner, 11 January 2019. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/trump-tweet-in-farsi-the-most-liked-
persian-tweet-in-history-of-twitter.  
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In the military (M) domain, U.S. actions seem to be creating desired effects given Saudi 
Arabia and Iran’s status as geopolitical ally (Saudi Arabia) or adversary (Iran). In Saudi Arabia, 
military sales from the United States will likely exceed over 110 billion dollars over the next 
several years - helping the Saudis modernize their force and, in the process, stimulating both 
economies.56 In Iran, even as sanctions have failed to change Iranian behavior, strong U.S. 
military actions aimed at deterring Iranian aggression appear to have altered (in the near term) 
the Iranian risk calculus for leveraging their military apparatus against U.S. forces. After the U.S. 
strike that killed Iranian General Qasem Soulemanei, Iran appeared reluctant to retaliate in a 
proportional and meaningful way against the United States.57 These efforts in the military 
domain demonstrate that it is possible to reward allies (Saudi Arabia) and hold adversaries 
accountable through demonstrations of American military resolve and strength. Critically, 
neither of the actions taken in the military domain preclude or nullify the recommended suite of 
DIME actions aimed at encouraging reform efforts in both countries.  
As a concluding thought, it is worth highlighting that none of the actions recommended 
above represent a “silver bullet” that can quickly and decisively usher in desired reforms 
overnight. Even taken collectively as coordinated actions across the DIME spectrum, change 
itself is a process and long-term proposal. Realist skeptics will no doubt characterize the above 
value-based actions as naive- or downright foolish- in an international community composed of 
states with defined and entrenched interests to defend. But if the DIME recommendations 
proposed here seem unrealistic, it seems more unrealistic to assume that Iran, a state adversary 
with (competing) interests of its own vis a vis the United States, will be coerced into changing its 
behavior. Realist skeptics should ask themselves what about the current interest-based policies 
regarding Iran are bringing success. Little about recent coercive actions undertaken as policy 
measures suggest progress towards forcing Iran to change its behavior. Military deterrence has 
shown the most promise in checking Iranian aggression and the suite of DIME actions 
recommended above can be implemented without abandoning this critical military role The 
recommended suite of DIME actions also advance a coherent theme advocating the premise that 
it is better to entice adversaries to American values rather than coerce them. In this sense, the 
recommendations reflect idealist principles. By treating stability and peace as desired ends and 
critical interests, and military deterrence as an effective means for achieving those ends, the 
recommendations also reflect realist principles. According to popular legend, Einstein defined 
insanity as expecting a different result through repeated identical attempts and the long-standing 
policy actions that have failed to change Iranian behavior should be viewed in this light. Policy 
actions that break Iran (i.e. its economy and citizenry) in order to coerce behavior change 
represent, at best, Pyrrhic victories that do little to accomplish true and enduring change and the 
long-term required progress.  
Conclusion 
 Even as Iran and Saudi Arabia engage in a rivalry that puts them at odds with each other 
and, concurrently, on opposing ends of the relational spectrum with the United States, all three 
countries share a unique point in history that once engendered cooperation and suggested an 
 
56 US Department of State: U.S. Security Cooperation with Saudi Arabia. https://www.state.gov/u-s-
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57 Raf Sanchez. US has Encouraging Intelligence that Iran is Backing Down. Telegraph. 09 Jan 2020. 
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immense potential for friendship. As the global order shifted after WWII and ushered in the 
United States as the world’s preeminent power, both Saudi Arabia and Iran courted American 
friendship as a welcome alternative to the exploitation that seemed to characterize the Middle 
East under the imperial world order. After WWII, Mohammed Reza Shah, Iran’s leader, made 
passionate appeals for American support to Iranian nationalism – drawing similarities between 
Iran’s nationalistic agenda to the American Revolution.58 A period of intense cooperation 
through the appointment of American business, military, and government advisors in Iran 
followed.59 Similarly, King Abdul-Aziz met President Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake aboard 
the USS Quincy in 1945, beginning the so-called “special relationship” between the Kingdom 
and the United States.60 At this inflection point, American ideals resonated loudly on the world 
stage-particularly in Middle Eastern countries that had just unshackled themselves from colonial 
practices. Yet, as America accumulated global interests, disillusionment with Western ideals, in 
one way or another, took hold in both countries. In Iran, American involvement in the coup 
d’état that ousted President Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 contributed to anti-American 
sentiment that culminated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In Saudi Arabia, the perception of 
unfettered American support to Israel at the expense of Arab Palestinians drove a wedge in the 
relationship that manifested itself through the 1973 oil embargo that “weaponized” oil and 
greatly impacted global energy markets. 
Since the disillusionment, the re-introduction of the potential of Western values has 
proven difficult in Saudi Arabia and Iran. History and the role of religion has created inverted 
paradigms for Western-aligned reform initiatives in each country. In Saudi Arabia, top-down 
change agents from the government encounter resistance from bottom-up expectations of the 
citizenry. In Iran, bottom-up change agents fail to overcome the top-down political power 
structures of the regime. In Saudi Arabia, a politically closed system clashes with “invisible 
power” from the citizenry to frustrate reform. In Iran, an open system generating reform 
initiatives fails to coalesce into a unifying force to challenge the “visible power” structures of the 
regime. These dynamics leave each country on un-equal footing with respect to the prospects of 
adopting Western-style reforms. While Iran, possessing all the ingredients of a complex and 
developed economic and social system, requires reform, Saudi Arabia, with a one-dimensional 
economy and unsustainable expectations from its citizenry, requires a re-forming of its economy 
and national expectations.  
 
58 Michael Axworthy, History of Iran, 232. 
59 Michael Axworthy. History of Iran, 234 
60 Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, 271. 
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FIGURE 3: A Healthy Change Mode
 
Healthy reform should not be a zero-sum proposition that prescribes winners and losers. 
Rather, it should be a shared burden and commitment towards progress. The potential for 
Western values to infuse the Middle East seemed to ring loudest when American ideals balanced 
its global interests as the U.S. entered the world stage after WWII. Therefore, the best way to 
support reform initiatives in Iran and Saudi Arabia demands that the United States also change 
and stand on its values while assuming some risk in its interests. For Saudi Arabia, the United 
States should model noble political behavior and refrain from frivolous, unwarranted, and 
politically motivated attacks that compromise its image and reputation – not to mention the 
credibility of Western values.  In Iran, the United States should let its economic values stand 
alone to attract and entice others- renouncing economic sanctions that only serve to undermine 
reform initiatives and discredit moderate Iranian leaders. These actions require the United States 
to assume some risk in its short-term security interests. However, the long-term benefits of a 
peacefully resolved Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and a stable Middle East far outweigh the risks. 
These actions also reflect biblical mandates to encourage peaceful living amongst neighbors and 
friends– whether in the local or international neighborhood- and help fulfill the hopes and 
aspirations of friendship between the West and the Middle East deferred since America’s ascent 
to world prominence after WWII.  
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